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Abstract. We generalize two well-known game-theoretic models by in-
troducing multiple partners matching games, defined by a graph G =
(N,E), with an integer vertex capacity function b and an edge weight-
ing w. The set N consists of a number of players that are to form a set
M ⊆ E of 2-player coalitions ij with value w(ij), such that each player
i is in at most b(i) coalitions. A payoff is a mapping p : N ×N → R with
p(i, j) + p(j, i) = w(ij) if ij ∈M and p(i, j) = p(j, i) = 0 if ij /∈M . The
pair (M,p) is called a solution. A pair of players i, j with ij ∈ E \M
blocks a solution (M,p) if i, j can form, possibly only after withdrawing
from one of their existing 2-player coalitions, a new 2-player coalition in
which they are mutually better off. A solution is stable if it has no block-
ing pairs. We give a polynomial-time algorithm that either finds that no
stable solution exists, or obtains a stable solution. Previously this result
was only known for multiple partners assignment games, which corre-
spond to the case where G is bipartite (Sotomayor, 1992) and for the
case where b ≡ 1 (Biro et al., 2012). We also characterize the set of sta-
ble solutions of a multiple partners matching game in two different ways
and initiate a study on the core of the corresponding cooperative game,
where coalitions of any size may be formed.
1 Introduction
Consider a group of soccer teams participating in a series of friendly games
with each other off-season. Suppose each team has some specific target number
of games it wants to play. For logistic reasons, not every two teams can play
against each other. Each game brings in some revenue, which is to be shared by
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the two teams involved. The revenue of a game may depend on several factors,
such as the popularity of the two teams involved or the soccer stadium in which
the game is played. In particular, at the time when the schedule for these games
is prepared, the expected gain may well depend on future outcomes in the current
season (which are in general difficult to predict [17]). In this paper, we assume
for simplicity that the revenues are known. Is it possible to construct a stable
fixture of games, that is, a schedule such that there exist no two unmatched
teams that are better off by playing against each other? Note that this could
require them to first cancel one of their others games in order not to exceed their
targets.
The above example describes the problem introduced in this paper. We model
it as follows. A multiple partners matching game is a triple (G, b, w), where
G = (N,E) is a finite undirected graph on n vertices and m edges with no loops
and no multiple edges, b : N → Z+ is a nonnegative integer function called
a vertex capacity function, and w : E → R+ is a nonnegative edge weighting.
The set N is called the player set. There exists an edge ij ∈ E if and only if
players i, j can form a 2-player coalition. A set M ⊆ E is a b-matching if every
player i is incident to at most b(i) edges of M . So, a b-matching is a set of 2-
player coalitions, in which no player is involved in more 2-player coalitions than
described by her capacity. If ij ∈ M then i and j are matched by M . With M
we associate a binary vector xM : E → {0, 1} called the characteristic function
of M , which is defined by xM (ij) = 1 for all ij ∈ M and xM (ij) = 0 for all
ij ∈ E \ M . Then we can write ∑j:ij∈E xM (ij) ≤ b(i) for all i ∈ N as an
alternative way to state the capacity condition. The value of a 2-player coalition
i, j with ij ∈ E is given by w(ij).
A nonnegative function p : N × N → R+ is a payoff with respect to M if
p(i, j) + p(j, i) = w(ij) for ij ∈ M and p(i, j) = p(j, i) = 0 for ij /∈ M ; we also
say that M and p are compatible. Note that p prescribes how the value w(ij)
of a 2-player coalition {i, j} is distributed amongst i and j, ensuring that non-
coalitions between two players yield a zero payoff. A pair (M,p), where M is a
b-matching and p is a payoff compatible with M , is a solution for (G, b, w). If M
is a 1-matching (i.e, a matching) then, for each i ∈ N , we have p(i, j) > 0 for at
most one player j 6= i, which must be matched to i. Hence, if b ≡ 1, we assume,
with slight abuse of notation, that p is a nonnegative function defined on N .
Let (M,p) be a solution. Two players i, j with ij ∈ E \M may decide to
form a new 2-player coalition if they are “better off”, even if one or both of
them must first leave an existing 2-player coalition in M (in order not to exceed
their individual capacity). To describe this formally we define a utility function
up : N → R+, related to payoff p. If i is saturated by M , that is, if i is incident
with b(i) edges in M , then we let up(i) = min{p(i, j) | xM (ij) = 1} be the
worst payoff p(i, j) of any 2-player coalition i is involved in. Otherwise, i is
unsaturated by M and we define up(i) = 0. A pair i, j with ij ∈ E \M blocks
(M,p) if up(i) +up(j) < w(ij). We say that (M,p) is stable if it has no blocking
pairs, or equivalently, if every edge ij ∈ E \M satisfies the stability condition
up(i) + up(j) ≥ w(ij). We can now define our problem formally:
Stable Fixture with Payments (SFP)
Instance: A multiple partners matching game (G, b, w)
Question: Does (G, b, w) have a stable solution?
So far, we modelled only situations in which 2-player coalitions can be formed.
Allowing coalitions of any size is a natural and well-studied setting in the area
of Cooperative Game Theory. Moreover, as we will discuss, there exist close re-
lationships between stable solutions and their counterpart in the second setting,
the so-called core allocations, which we define below.
A cooperative game with transferable utilities (TU-game) is a pair (N, v),
where N is a set of n players and a value function v : 2N → R+ with v(∅) = 0.
It is usually assumed that the grand coalition N is formed. Then the central
problem is how to allocate the total value v(N) to the individual players in N .
In this context, a payoff (or allocation) is a vector p ∈ RN with p(N) = v(N),
where we write p(S) =
∑
i∈S p(i) for S ⊆ N . The core of a TU-game consists of
all allocations p ∈ RN satisfying
p(S) ≥ v(S), ∅ 6= S ⊆ N
p(N) = v(N)
(1)
A core allocation is seen as reasonable, because it offers no incentive for a subset
of players to leave the grand coalition and form a coalition on their own. However,
a TU-game may have an empty core. Hence, the most interesting computational
complexity questions (given an input game) are:
1. Is the core nonempty?
2. Can we exhibit a vector in the core – provided there is any?
3. Does a given vector p ∈ RN belong to the core?
In the literature both polynomial-time and NP-hardness results are known for
each of these three questions (see e.g. [8]). An efficient algorithm for answer-
ing question 3 implies that questions 1-2 can be solved in polynomial time
as well. This follows from the work of Gro¨tschel, Lova´sz and Schrijver [13, 14]
who proved, by refining the ellipsoid method of Khachiyan [18], that an effi-
cient algorithm for solving the separation problem for a polyhedron P implies a
polynomial-time algorithm that either finds that P is empty, or obtains a vector
of P .
We define the TU-game (N, v) that corresponds with a multiple partners
matching game (G, b, w) by setting, for every S ⊆ N ,
v(S) = w(MS) =
∑
e∈MS
w(e),
where MS is a maximum weight b-matching in the subgraph of G induced by S
(we define v(S) = 0 if S induces an edgeless graph). We say that (N, v) is defined
on (G, b, w) but, unless confusion is possible, we may also call (N, v) a multiple
partners matching game. If we say that the payoff vector p of a stable solution
is a core allocation, we mean that the total payoff vector pt ∈ RN defined by
pt(i) =
∑
ij∈E p(i, j) for all i ∈ N is a core allocation.
Example. Let G be the 4-vertex cycle v1v2v3v4v1. We define a vertex capacity
function b by b(v1) = b(v2) = 1 and b(v3) = b(v4) = 2, and an edge weighting
w by w(v1v2) = 3 and w(v2v3) = w(v3v4) = w(v4v1) = 1. The pair (M,p) with
M = {v1v2, v3v4} and p(v1, v2) = p(v2, v1) = 32 , p(v3, v4) = p(v4, v3) = 12 and
p(v2, v3) = p(v3, v2) = p(v4, v1) = p(v1, v4) = 0 is a solution for the multiple
partners matching game (G, b, w). Note that up(v1) = up(v2) =
3
2 and up(v3) =
up(v4) = 0. We find that (M,p) is even a stable solution, because up(v2) +
up(v3) =
3
2 ≥ 1 = w(v2v3) and up(v4) + up(v1) = 32 ≥ 1 = w(v4v1) (note that
we only need to verify the stability condition for edges outside the matching).
Moreover, the total payoff vector pt given by pt(v1) = p
t(v2) =
3
2 and p
t(v3) =
pt(v4) =
1
2 is readily seen to be a core allocation of the corresponding TU-game.
In Section 3 we will give an example of a multiple partners matching game with
no stable solutions for which the corresponding TU-game has a nonempty core.
Before stating our results for multiple partners matching games in both settings
we first discuss some existing work. As we will see, our model in both settings
generalizes (or relaxes) several well-known models.
Known Results. The first model that we discuss is related to the famous stable
marriage problem (SM), defined by Gale and Shapley [11] as follows. Given sets
I and J of men and women, respectively, let each player have a strict preference
ordering over the opposite set of players. A set of marriages is a matching in
the underlying bipartite graph with partition classes I and J . Such a matching
is stable if there is no unmarried pair, who would prefer to marry each other
instead of a possible other partner. Gale and Shapley [11] proved that every
instance of this problem has a stable matching and gave a linear-time algorithm
that finds one. The main assumptions in this model are
(i) monogamy: each player is matched to at most one other player (1-matching);
(ii) opposite-sex: every match is between players from I and J (bipartiteness);
(iii) no dowry: only cardinal preferences are considered (no payments).
Dropping one or more of these three conditions leads to seven new models, one
of which corresponds to our model of multiple partner matching games, namely
the one, in which none of the three conditions (i)–(iii) is imposed. Below we
briefly survey the other six models (see also Table 1).
opposite-sex different-sex allowed
monogamy no dowry SM (stable marriage) SR (stable roommates)
dowry SMP & assignment game SRP & matching game
bigamy no dowry many-to-many stable matching SF (stable fixtures)
allowed dowry MPA & mp assignment game SFP & mp matching game
Table 1. The eight different models; “mp” stands for “multiple partners”, and the
highlighted case is the new model introduced and considered in this paper.
In the first three models that we discuss, payments are not allowed. Hence,
the notion of a (core) allocation is meaningless for these three models.
Not (i). If we allow bigamy, that is, if we allow general b-matchings instead of only
1-matchings, we obtain the many-to-many stable matching problem, which gen-
eralizes the stable marriage problem. The problem variant, in which we demand
that b(i) = 1 for each player i ∈ I, is called the college admission problem [11],
which is also known as the many-to-one stable matching problem [25] and as the
hospital/residents problem [23]. Gale and Shapley [11] proved that every instance
of the college admission problem has a stable matching and gave a linear-time
algorithm that finds one. Ba¨ıou and Balinski [1] proved these two results for the
(more general) many-to-many stable matching problem.
Not (ii). If we allow same-sex marriages, so the underlying graph may be non-
bipartite, then we get the stable roommates problem (SR), also defined by Gale
and Shapley [11]. They proved that, unlike the previously discussed models, in
this model a stable matching does not always exist. Irving [15] gave a linear-time
algorithm for finding a stable matching (if there exists one).
Not (i) & (ii). Allowing bigamy and same-sex marriages leads to the stable fix-
tures problem (SF), which generalizes the stable roommates problem. Hence, a
stable matching does not always exist. Irving and Scott [16] gave a linear-time
algorithm for finding a stable matching (if there exists one). Cechla´rova´ and
Fleiner [5] defined the more general multiple activities problem, in which the un-
derlying graph may have multiple edges. They proved that even in this setting a
stable matching can be found in polynomial time (if there exists one). Moreover,
they also showed that this problem can be reduced to SR by a polynomial size
graph construction.
In the remaining three models we allow payments to individual players.
Not (iii). If we allow dowry then we obtain an assignment game, which is a
multiple partners matching game (G, b, w) where G is bipartite and b ≡ 1. In
this case the SFP problem is known as the stable marriage problem with payments
(SMP). Koopmans and Beckmann [21] proved that every instance of SMP has
a stable solution. Shapley and Shubik [27] proved that every core allocation is a
payoff vector in a stable solution and vice versa. Consequently, every assignment
game has a nonempty core. It is possible to obtain a stable solution in polynomial
time and also to give affirmative answers to questions 1-3 about the core of an
assignment game; in the next paragraph we explain that this holds even if we
allow same-sex marriages.
Not (ii) & (iii). If we allow dowry and same-sex marriages then we obtain a
matching game, which is a multiple partners matching game (G, b, w) where
b ≡ 1. In this case the SFP problem is called the stable roommates problem with
payments (SRP). The following two observations are well-known [4, 10] and easy
to verify. First, a payoff p is a core allocation of a matching game if and only
if there exists a matching M , such that (M,p) is a stable solution. Second, for
matching games, the coalitions in the system of inequalities (1) may be restricted
to 2-player coalitions. The latter means that question 3, on core membership,
can be answered in linear time. We also obtain polynomial-time algorithms for
solving questions 1-2, about core nonemptiness, and finding a core allocation, and
thus finding a stable solution; the restriction to 2-player coalitions even allows
one to use the ellipsoid method of Khachiyan [18] directly. In a previous paper [4],
we circumvented the ellipsoid method and presented an O(nm + n2 log n)-time
algorithm that either finds that the core is empty, or obtains a core allocation.
Not (i) & (iii). If we allow dowry and bigamy then we obtain a multiple partners
assignment game, which is a multiple partners matching game (G, b, w) where
G is bipartite. In this case the SFP problem is called the multiple partners as-
signment problem (MPA). Just as matching games, multiple partners assignment
games generalize assignment games. Sotomayor proved the following, which an-
swers questions 1-2 positively (the answer to question 3 is still open).
Theorem 1 ([28]). Every multiple partners assignment game has at least one
stable solution, which can be found in polynomial time. Moreover, for every stable
solution (M,p) it holds that M has maximum weight, p is a core allocation and
every other maximum weight b-matching is compatible with p.
Our Results. In Section 2 we will prove that SFP is polynomial-time solvable.
This generalizes the aforementioned corresponding results for SRP and MPA,
respectively. Our proof technique is based on a reduction to MPA. Moreover,
we characterize the set of stable solutions for a given instance of SFP via a
reduction to SRP. We do this via linear programming techniques that show a
close relationship between optimal solutions in the dual LP for SFP and stable
solutions in the reduced instance of SRP.
In Section 3 we first prove that also for multiple partners matching games, the
payoff vectors in stable solutions are always core allocations. We then prove that
core membership, which corresponds to question 3, is polynomial-time solvable
for multiple partner matching games defined on a triple (G, b, w) with b ≤ 2, that
is, with b(i) ≤ 2 for all i ∈ N . Due to the aforementioned result of Gro¨tschel,
Lova´sz and Schrijver [13, 14] we also obtain efficient answers to questions 1–2 (for
b ≤ 2). In our proof, we make a connection to the tramp steamer problem [19].
Finally, in Section 4, we give some directions for future work.
2 Stable Fixtures with Payments
In order to prove our results we will use two known results as lemmas.
Lemma 1 ([3]). If (M,p) is a stable solution of an instance (G, 1, w) of SRP
then M has maximum weight, and every maximum weight matching M ′ of G is
compatible with p.
Lemma 2 ([22]). Let G be a graph with vertex capacity function b and edge
weighting w. Then it is possible to find a maximum-weight b-matching of G in
O(n2m log(n2/m)) time.
2.1 Characterizing Stable Solutions of SFP
In this subsection we show a correspondence of stable solutions of an instance
(G, b, w) of SFP with stable solutions of a corresponding instance (G′, 1, w′) of
SRP, where G′ is a graph of size O(n3), and with integral optimal solutions of
an LP relaxation.
We first explain how to construct (G′, 1, w′); see also Figure 1. Our construc-
tion is based on a well-known construction, which was introduced by Tutte [31]
for nonbipartite graphs with no edge weights. For each player i ∈ N with capac-
ity b(i) we create b(i) copies, i1, i2, . . . ib(i) in N ′. For each edge ij ∈ E we create
four players, ij , ij , ji, ji, with edges i
sij for s = 1 . . . b(i), ijij , ijji, jiji and jij
t
for t = 1 . . . b(j), each with weight w(ij). This completes our construction. We
write G′ = (N ′, E′). Note that G′ is bipartite if and only if G is bipartite. Hence,
our construction also reduces an instance of MPA to an instance of SMP.
wi j
wi j
wi j wi j wi j
wi j
wi j wi j
wi j
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1
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Fig. 1. The construction of an SPR instance (G′, 1, w′) from a SFP instance (G, b, w).
Given an instance (G, b, w) of SFP, we formulate the corresponding primal
LP, denoted by Primal-(G, b, w), as follows.
max
∑
ij∈E
w(ij)x(ij) (P-obj)
subject to
∑
j:ij∈E
x(ij) ≤ b(i) for each i ∈ N (a)
0 ≤ x(ij) ≤ 1 for each ij ∈ E. (b)
The integral solutions of this LP are the b-matchings of instance (G, b, w). We
now formulate the dual LP, denoted by Dual-(G, b, w).
min
∑
i∈N
b(i)y(i) +
∑
ij∈E
d(ij) (D-obj)
subject to y(i) + y(j) + d(ij) ≥ w(ij) for each ij ∈ E, (a’)
where 0 ≤ y(i) for all i ∈ N, and 0 ≤ d(ij) for all ij ∈ E.
Note that for an optimal dual solution (y, d), it holds that d(ij) = [w(ij) −
y(i)− y(j)]+ (where the latter notation means max{w(ij)− y(i)− y(j), 0}).
We are now ready to prove our main result.
Theorem 2. Let (G, b, w) be an instance of SFP. The following statements are
equivalent.
1. (G, b, w) has a stable solution.
2. (G′, 1, w′) has a stable solution.
3. Primal-(G, b, w) has an integral optimal solution.
Proof. We prove in three separate statements that 1 implies 2, 2 implies 3 and
3 implies 1.
1⇒2. Given a stable solution (M,p) of (G, b, w), we define (M ′, p′) of (G′, 1, w′)
as follows. Recall that we define p′ as a function on N , as b ≡ 1. The payments
of the copies will be the same as the minimum payments of the original players,
that is, for each i ∈ N , let p′(is) = up(i) for every s = 1 . . . b(i). For each ij ∈M ,
if j is i’s s-th partner for some s ∈ {1 . . . b(i)} and i is j’s t-th partner for some
t ∈ {1 . . . b(j)} then let isij ∈ M ′ , ijji ∈ M ′ and jijt ∈ M ′ with the following
payments: p′(ij) = p(i, j) and p′(ij) = w(ij)−up(i), and similarly p′(ji) = p(j, i)
and p′(ji) = w(ij) − up(j). For each ij ∈ E \ M , let ijij , jiji ∈ M ′ with
p′(ij) = min{up(i), w(ij)} and p′(ij) = w(ij)−min{up(i), w(ij)}, and similarly
p′(ji) = w(ij) −min{up(j), w(ij)} and p′(ji) = min{up(j), w(ij)}. We observe
that (M ′, p′) is a solution for (G′, 1, w′). In order to prove that (M ′, p′) is a stable
solution we have to check the stability condition for each edge not in M ′. As
up′(i) = p
′(i) for any i ∈ N ′, this comes down to checking whether p′(i)+p′(j) ≥
w(ij) for all i, j ∈ N ′. For each edge isij not in M ′ there are two cases. In the first
case, when p′(ij) = w(ij)− up(i), the condition is satisfied by equality, because
p′(is) = up(i). In the other case, we have p′(ij) = w(ij)−min{up(i), w(ij)}, so
p′(is) + p′(ij) = up(i) + w(ij) −min{up(i), w(ij)} ≥ w(ij). For each edge ijij
not in M ′, p′(ij) = w(ij) − up(i) and p′(ij) = p(i, j), so p′(ij) + p′(ij) ≥ w(ij)
as up(i) ≤ p(i, j). Finally, if ijji is not in M ′ then in the first case, when any
payoff of the middle players is w(ij), the requirement is trivially true, and in the
second case when the payoffs of both players differ from w(ij) the stability of
(M,p) implies that p′(ij) + p′(ji) = up(i) + up(j) ≥ w(ij).
2⇒3 Suppose that (M ′, p′) be a stable solution for (G′, 1, w′). We will first prove
that (M ′, p′) can be transformed into a stable solution (M ′′, p′) of (G′, 1, w′),
where M ′′ is a matching that we may obtain by the above reduction from
(G, b, w) to (G′, 1, w′). From Lemma 1 we know that M ′ is a maximum weight
matching in (G′, 1, w′). For a player set X let E(X) denote the set of edges
incident to any player in X. Let Eij = E({ij , ij , ji, ji}). Considering the edge
set Eij , either three or two edges should be contained in a maximum weight
matching M ′. If |Eij ∩ M ′| = 3 then M ′ should contain ijji, isij for some
s ∈ {1, . . . , b(i)} and jijt for some t ∈ {1, . . . , b(j)}. Let M ′′ contain the same
edges in this case. If |Eij ∩M ′| = 2 then let {ijij , jiji} ⊆ M ′′. Therefore M ′′
is a maximum weight matching, and from Lemma 1, (M ′′, p′) is a stable so-
lution in (G′, 1, w′), which can be obtained from a reduction from (G, b, w)
to (G′, 1, w′), as described in the first part of our proof. Now we note that
p′(is) = p′(it) for any indices s, t ∈ {1 . . . b(i)}. This is because p′(is) < p′(it)
would imply that p′(is) > 0, so is must be covered by M ′, say, isi¯j ∈M ′, where
p′(is)+p′(i¯j) = w(ij), and hence ir i¯j would be blocking, a contradiction. There-
fore we can set y(i) = p′(is) for every copy is of i ∈ N , as this is well-defined.
Together with d(ij) = [w(ij) − y(i) − y(j)]+ for any ij ∈ E we get a feasible
solution (y, d) of Dual-(G, b, w). Now we define an integral feasible solution x
of Primal-(G, b, w) as follows. Let x(ij) = 1 if ijji ∈ M ′′ and x(ij) = 0 other-
wise. We prove that (y, d) and x are both optimal solutions as they satisfy the
complementary slackness conditions.
– If
∑
j:ij∈E x(ij) < b(i) then some copy of i ∈ N , say is, is unmatched in
M ′′, therefore y(i) = p′(is) = 0.
– If x(ij) < 1 for some ij ∈ E then ijji /∈ M ′′ and therefore y(i) + y(j) ≥
p′(ij) + p′(ji) ≥ w(ij), where the first inequality is implied by the stability
condition for isij /∈M ′′ and jtji /∈M ′′, and the second inequality is implied
by the stability condition for ijji /∈ M ′′. As a consequence d(ij) = [w(ij)−
y(i)− y(j)]+ = 0 should hold.
– If x(ij) > 0 then ijji ∈M ′′ and therefore y(i)+y(j) ≤ p′(ij)+p′(ji) = w(ij),
where the inequality is implied by the stability condition for ijij /∈M ′′ and
jiji /∈ M ′′. As a consequence d(ij) = w(ij) − y(i) − y(j) and the dual
condition (a’) is binding.
Hence x is an optimal integral solution for Primal-(G, b, w), as required.
3⇒1 From an optimal solution x of Primal-(G, b, w) and optimal dual solution
(y, d) of Dual-(G, b, w) we create a stable solution (M,p) for (G, b, w) as follows.
Let M be the b-matching defined by the characteristic function x. For each
ij ∈ M we choose ξ(i, j) ≥ 0 and ξ(j, i) ≥ 0 with ξ(i, j) + ξ(j, i) = d(ij) and
define p(i, j) = y(i) + ξ(i, j), and otherwise we define p(i, j) = 0. These are valid
payments, as x(ij) = 1 implies p(i, j) + p(j, i) = y(i) + ξ(i, j) + y(j) + ξ(j, i) =
y(i) + y(j) + d(ij) = w(ij), where the last equality is coming from the fact
that condition (a’) is binding. Now we show that up(i) ≥ y(i) for every i ∈ N .
If i is unsaturated by M then up(i) = y(i) = 0 again by the complementary
slackness condition for y(i). If i is saturated then for every ij ∈ M we have
p(i, j) ≥ y(i) by our setting of p(i, j), and therefore up(i) ≥ y(i) by the definition
of up(i). Finally, if ij /∈ M then x(ij) < 1 implies d(ij) = 0. Consequently,
up(i) + up(j) ≥ y(i) + y(j) ≥ w(ij), where the last equality is due to the fact
that (a’) is tight. This completes our proof. uunionsq
Remark 1. From the proof of Theorem 2 we note that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the stable payments in an SFP instance (G, b, w) and
the utilities of some of the players in its reduced SPR instance (G′, 1, w′), namely
a pair (M,p) is a stable solution for (G, b, w) if and only if there exists a stable
solution (M ′, p′) for (G′, 1, w′) with p′(ij) = p(i, j) for every ij ∈M .
Remark 2. Assume (G, b, w) is a solvable instance of SFP. Then there is a one-
to-one correspondence between the dual variables y of an optimal solution (y, d)
of Dual-(G, b, w) and the stable payoffs of the players’ copies in the reduction G′.
2.2 Solving SFP efficiently
In order to solve SFP on an instance (G, b, w), we construct the instance (G′, 1, w′)
of SRP. This takes O(n3) time as we may assume without loss of generality
that b(i) ≤ n for all i ∈ N and thus |V (G′)| = ∑i∈N b(i) + 4m = O(n2) and
|E(G′)| ≤ ∑i∈N b(i)n + 3m ≤ n3 + 3m = O(n3). We then use the aforemen-
tioned algorithm of Biro´ et al. [4] to compute in O(n′m′ + n′2 log n′) = O(n5)
time a stable solution for (G′, 1, w′) or else conclude that (G′, 1, w′) has no sta-
ble solution. In the first case we can modify the stable solution into a stable
solution of (G, b, w) in O(n3) time, as described in the proof of Theorem 2. In
the second case, Theorem 2 tells us that (G, b, w) has no stable solution. The
total running time is O(n5). Below we present an algorithm that solves SFP in
O(n2m log(n2/m)) time.
A half-b-matching in a graph G = (N,E) with an integer vertex capacity
function b and an edge weighting w is an edge mapping f that maps each edge e
to a value in {0, 12 , 1}, such that
∑
e:v∈e f(e) ≤ b(v) for each v ∈ N . The weight
of f is w(f) =
∑
e∈E w(e)f(e).
Let (G, b, w) be an instance of SFP. We define its duplicated instance (Gˆ, bˆ, wˆ)
of MPA as follows. We replace each player i of G by two players i′ and i′′ in
Gˆ with the same capacities, that is, we set bˆ(i′) = bˆ(i′′) = b(i). Moreover, we
replace each edge ij by two edges i′j′′ and i′′j′ with half-weights, that is, we set
wˆ(i′j′′) = wˆ(i′′j′) = 12w(ij).
In a previous work [4], three of us proved the following statement for instances
of SRP only. In our next theorem we generalize this result for instances of SFP
by using similar arguments (proof omitted due to space restrictions).
Theorem 3. An instance (G, b, w) of SFP admits a stable solution if and only
if the maximum weight of a b-matching in G is equal to the maximum weight of
a half-b-matching in G.
We note that the maximum weight of a b-matching can be computed in
O(n2m log(n2/m)) time, as described in Lemma 2. The maximum weight of a
half-b-matching can be computed in the same running time, since the maximum
weight of a half-b-matching in (G, b, w) is the same as the maximum weight of
a b-matching in a duplicated bipartite graph (Gˆ, bˆ, wˆ), as explained in the proof
of Theorem 3. This leads to the following result.
Theorem 4. SFP can be solved in O(n2m log(n2/m)) time.
3 Core Properties
We first present the following result, which is in line with corresponding results
for the other models and thus shows that the notion of stability is well defined
with respect to the core definition. We omit the proof due to page restrictions.
Proposition 1. The payoff vector of every stable solution of a multiple partners
matching game is a core allocation.
In contrast to our results in Section 2, the analysis of the core cannot be
reduced to the the case in which we have unit vertex capacities. We illustrate
this by giving the following example that shows that the core of a multiple
partners matching game can be nonempty whilst there exist no stable solutions.
Example 1. Take a diamond, that is, a cycle on three vertices s1, s2, s3 to which
we add a fourth vertex u with edges s2u and s3u. We set b(si) = 2 for i = 1, 2, 3
and b(u) = 1, and w ≡ 1. Then Theorem 3 tells us that a stable solution does
not exist, since the maximum weight of a b-matching is 3, whilst the maximum
weight of a half-b-matching is 3 12 (for the latter, take f(s1s2) = f(s1s3) = 1 and
f(s2s3) = f(s2u) = f(s3u) =
1
2 ). However, the total payoff vector p
t defined
by pt(si) = 1 for i = 1, . . . , 3 and p
t(u) = 0, which corresponds to, say, the
b-matching M = {s1s2, s1s3, s2s3} with payments p(s1, s2) = 1, p(s2, s3) = 1
and p(s3, s1) = 1 and zero payments for the other edges is in the core.
Moreover, the core of a multiple partners matching game may be empty. This is
clear for b ≡ 1 (for instance, take a triangle on three vertices and let w ≡ 1) but
may also be the case for b 6= 1. We illustrate the latter by presenting the following
example, which shows that the core of a b-matching game may be empty even if
b ≡ 2.
Example 2. Take a net, that is, a cycle on three vertices s1, s2 and s3 to which
we add a pendant (degree 1) vertex ti to si for i = 1, 2, 3. We set b ≡ 2 and
w ≡ 1. Then v(N) = 4. We may assume without loss of generality that p(ti) = 0
for i = 1, 2, 3. Then, by symmetry, p(si) =
4
3 for i = 1, 2, 3. Take the coalition
S = {s1, s2, t1, t2}. It holds that p(S) = 2 × 43 < 3 = v(S) and thus the core of
this game is empty.
In what follows, we analyze the case b(i) ≤ 2 for i = 1, ..., n. Note that a player
i with b(i) = 0 necessarily gets 0 payoff in any core allocation, so the problem
reduces trivially to G\{i}. For this reason we assume b(i) ≥ 1 for all i ∈ N in
the following.
Our main result is that answering question 3, on testing core membership, can
be done in polynomial time, hereby answering question 3 positively. Recall that
this implies the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm that either finds that
the core is empty, or else obtains a core allocation. As mentioned in Section 1,
our algorithm uses an algorithm that solves the tramp steamer problem, which
we formally define below, as a subproblem.
Let G = (N,E) be a graph with an edge weighting p : E → R+ called the
profit function and an edge weighting w : E → R+ called the cost function. Let
C = (NC , EC) be a (simple) cycle of G. The profit-to-cost ratio for a cycle C
is p(C)w(C) where we write p(C) = p(EC) and w(C) = w(EC). The tramp steamer
problem is that of finding a cycle C with maximum profit-to-cost ratio. This
problem is well-known to be polynomial-time solvable both for directed and
undirected graphs (see [19], or [24] for a treatment of more general “fractional
optimization” problems).
Lemma 3. The tramp steamer problem can be solved in polynomial time.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 5. It is possible to test in polynomial time if an allocation is in the
core of a multiple partners matching game defined on a triple (G, b, w) with b ≤ 2.
Proof. Let (N, v) be a multiple partners matching game defined on a triple
(G, b, w), where b(i) ≤ 2 for all i ∈ N . Given S ⊆ N , a maximum weight
b-matching in G[S] is composed of cycles and paths. Hence the core can be
alternatively described by the following (slightly smaller) set of constraints:
p(C) ≥ w(C), for all cycles C ∈ C
p(P ) ≥ w(P ), for all paths P ∈ P
p(N) = v(N).
(2)
Here, C stands for the set of simple cycles C ⊆ E in G with b(i) = 2 for all
i ∈ V (C). Similarly, P stands for the set of simple paths P with b(i) = 2 for all
inner points on P .
Given p ∈ RN , we can of course easily check whether p(N) = v(N) holds by
computing a maximum weight b-matching in G, which can be done in polynomial
time by Lemma 2. Thus we are left with the inequalities for cycles and paths
in (2).
We deal with the cycles first. Let N2 := {i ∈ N | b(i) = 2} and G2 := G[N2].
In the induced graph G2 = (N2, E2), we “discharge” the given allocations p(i)
to the edges by setting p(i, j) := (p(i) + p(j))/2 for every edge ij in G2. This
defines an edge weighting p : E2 → R such that, obviously, the core constraints
for cycles are equivalent to
max
C∈C
w(C)
p(C)
≤ 1,
where the maximum is taken over all cycles in G2. Hence we obtained an instance
of the tramp steamer problem, which is polynomial-time solvable by Lemma 3.
Note that by solving the above minimization problem we either find that all
cycle constraints in (2) are satisfied or we end up with a particular cycle C cor-
responding to a violated core inequality. (The latter is of particular importance
if we intend to use the “membership oracle” as a subroutine for the ellipsoid
method.)
In what follows, we thus assume that all cycle constraints in (2) are satisfied
by the given vector p ∈ RN and turn to the path constraints. We process these
separately for all possible endpoints i0, j0 ∈ N (with i0 6= j0) and all possible
lengths k = 1, ..., n − 1. Let Pk(i0, j0) ⊆ P denote the set of (simple) i0 − j0-
paths of length k in G. We construct a corresponding auxiliary graph Gk(i0, j0),
a subgraph of G× Pk+1, the product of G with a path of length k. To this end,
let N
(1)
2 , ..., N
(k−1)
2 be k − 1 copies of N2. The vertex set of Gk(i0, j0) is then
{i0, j0} ∪N (1)1 ∪ ... ∪N (k−1)2 . We denote the copy of i ∈ N2 in N (r)2 by i(r). The
edges of Gk(i0, j0) and their weights w¯ can then be defined as
(i0, j
(1)) for i0j ∈ E with weight w¯(i0j) := p(i0) + p(j)/2− w(i0j)
(i(r−1), j(r)) for ij ∈ E with weight w¯(ij) := (p(i) + p(j))/2− w(ij)
(i(k−1), j0) for ij0 ∈ E with weight w¯(ij0) := p(i)/2 + p(j0)− w(ij0).
We claim that p(P ) ≥ w(P ) holds for all P ∈ P if and only if the (w.r.t. w¯)
shortest i0−j0–path in Gk(i0, j0) has weight≥ 0 for all i0 6= j0 and k = 1, .., n−1.
Then what is left to do, in order to verify whether p(P ) ≥ w(P ) holds for all
P ∈ P, is to solve O(n3) instances of the shortest path problem, each of which
have size O(n2) by using the well-known Bellman-Ford algorithm [2].
First suppose some P ∈ P has p(P ) < w(P ). Let i0 and j0 denote its end-
points and let k denote its length. Then P ∈ Pk(i0, j0) corresponds to an i0−j0-
path P¯ in Gk(i0, j0) of weight w¯(P¯ ) < 0. Now we will show that p(P ) ≥ w(P )
for all P ∈ P implies w¯(P¯ ) ≥ 0 for all i0 − j0-paths P¯ in any Gk(i0, j0). Indeed,
an i0 − j0-path P¯ visiting players i0, i(1)1 , ..., i(k−1)k−1 , j0 corresponds to a simple
i0 − j0 path P ⊆ E in G plus possibly a number of cycles C1, ..., Cs ⊆ E. Fur-
thermore, by definition of w¯, we have w¯(P¯ ) = p(P )−w(P )+∑i p(Ci)−w(Ci) ≥
p(P )−w(P ), as we assume that p(C) ≥ w(C) holds for all cycles. Hence, indeed,
w¯(P¯ ) ≥ 0, as claimed. uunionsq
4 Future Work
We finish our paper with some directions for future research. Our reduction from
SFP to SRP might be used to generalize more known results from SRP to SFP.
For instance, can we generalize the path to stability result of Biro´ et al. [3] for
SRP to be valid for SFP as well?
We do not know the answers for questions 1–3 on the core of multiple partners
matching games (G, b, w) when b(i) ≥ 3 for some player i. In particular, we tend
to believe that testing core membership is NP-hard (for example, the case b ≡ 3
looks close to the maximum 3-regular subgraph problem, which is NP-complete,
see e.g. [12]). However, we did not succeed in finding a proof. We recall that
testing core membership is also open for multiple partners assignment games
(except when b ≤ 2).
Chalkiadakis et al. [6] defined cooperative games with overlapping coalitions,
where players can be involved in coalitions with different intensities, leading to
three alternative core definitions. It would be interesting to study the problem
of finding a stable solutions and questions 1–3 in these settings. To illustrate
this, suppose that the set of soccer teams from the example in Section 1 consists
of international teams. Then it seems realistic that the home team needs to
spend fewer days for playing the game than the visiting team, which must travel
from another country. Hence, every team now has a number of days for playing
friendly games instead of an upper limit (target) on the number of such games.
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